Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt
After Action Reports – Battle of Normandy
This document is the official report signed on June 20, 1944, by Generalfeldmarschall Karl von Rundstedt, Commander-in-Chief of German Forces West, describing the initial tactical lessons learned a few days after the Normandy landings. Intended for the fighting forces, and in particular for reinforcements moving towards the western combat zone, this document reflects the German view of events.
Generalfeldmarschall Karl R. Gerd von Rundstedt, Commander-in-Chief of German Forces West,
Source: Office of Naval Intelligence. “The O.N.I. Weekly”. 3, number 46 (15 Nov. 1944) : 3692-3699.
General Staff, June 20, 1944. Commander-in-Chief West, (High Command, Army Group D), Operations
Section No. 5050/44
Lessons identified from the D-Day Landings and the Battle of Normandy
A. Preliminary Remarks
1. Experience is useful when it is quickly brought to the attention of soldiers. This will be done gradually through the sending of several messages.
2. The following feedback summarizes what has happened so far. The services operating under the term “Distributor” are responsible for evaluating and completing the details according to their own judgment.
B.
The latest lessons learned from the most recent battles are broadly consistent with all the lessons learned from Sicily, Salerno, Nottuno, and the defensive battles in Italy.
The proximity of the British mother country, which provides transport and supplies for the Anglo-Saxons during their first land offensive west of the Bay of the Seine and along the Cotentin Peninsula, provides the opportunity to deploy a greater number of men, equipment, and technical resources. Preparations for this offensive, which are being conducted using quasi-scientific methods, have proven easier to carry out due to the extensive network of agents operating in the occupied western region. The orders for preparing and conducting invasion actions are extraordinarily numerous and varied.
The lessons learned from this particularly important battle must be taken into account in training and applied to all sectors not yet subject to combat. They must also be brought to the attention of military commands at the fronts, units on mission, protection forces, etc., throughout the occupied zones.
Four facts that must be highlighted:
(1) The enemy’s complete control of airspace.
(2) The enemy’s control of airborne and airborne troop deployments, as well as the massive nature of these deployments.
(3) The support of ground troops by artillery aboard powerful British warships, both cruisers and gunboats, which proved to be precise and diversified.
(4) The in-depth knowledge of each enemy unit participating in the invasion, including particularly precise intelligence on the coast, its obstacles, and its defensive installations, which allowed the enemy to have a superior force in terms of numbers and equipment in the beachhead after only a few days.
Faced with this, the German soldier stands out, with his qualities, but also his inability to react quickly and his lack of motivation to fight within a joint framework. The three armies have done their best so far and will continue to do so.
I
A — The Enemy Landing Procedure in Outline
(a) The enemy hoped to surprise us. They did not succeed. Air operations began on June 6, 1944, at approximately 1:00 a.m. west of the Bay of the Seine and over the Cotentin Peninsula. The enemy launched a powerful bombardment simultaneously at several locations. The enemy’s objective was to put us on alert and force us to remain under cover, allowing them to begin parachuting without the risk of being observed. In several locations, the paratroopers turned out to be puppets (with explosives in their crates). The goal: to divide our local reserves and disengage them from their crucial position, resulting in a loss of time for the defenders.
The airborne troops, deployed in numerous gliders of various sizes and beginning their descent over the sea or directly near their landing zone, landed at various locations in a coordinated manner according to a well-established plan that worked, reaching their targets with precision. Nevertheless, these airborne assaults were not a surprise, as our own command and troops had been expecting them for weeks and were ready. Thus, the enemy parachute and airborne troops suffered high (and in some places particularly bloody) losses and were destroyed in some places during their engagement. They failed to destroy the coastal defenses from inland. Only in the American beachhead sector north of Carentan, following our simultaneous attack on three sectors, did the airborne troops move toward the coastal defense sector after several days of fierce fighting, thus linking up with their own ground forces, which had successfully broken through and were thus reinforced and placed in reserve.
The techniques and tactics of the enemy airborne forces are highly developed. Particularly seasoned and prepared for combat, these soldiers have proven to be powerful fighters, adapting quickly to the terrain!
We must recognize that it is possible that, in addition to the parachuted troops, special units with specific missions (reconnaissance, actions against command posts, ammunition depots, rear communications centers, etc., demolitions, breakthrough actions) different from those carried out as part of the invasion could also be dropped. We must accurately determine their potential targets by all possible means. (b) The landing itself began four or five hours after the airborne assault. The enemy anticipated its preparations in order to land with the rising tide—a fact we had previously judged highly likely—and at low tide due to the presence of numerous underwater obstacles along the beaches, of which they were aware.
This maneuver was rehearsed several weeks before the actual landing by landings conducted in England. The enemy was then able to force its tanks through the lines of underwater obstacles along the beach while special troops opened breaches for the rest of the troops.
The boats and men on board suffered significant losses where the sea covered these obstacles, and those on dry land slowed the landing, increasing the enemy losses due to our fire.
The beginning of amphibious operations. Fully visible, conducted from 6:00 a.m. Before the landing, there was a massive bombardment of impressive intensity from both air and sea, using all weapons and calibers. As a result, the field defenses were more or less overwhelmed, with only the strongest fortifications remaining intact. The enemy infiltrated the breaches created without attempting to attack these important fortifications and strongpoints. These strongpoints held in some cases for more than a week, thus dividing the enemy forces. By holding out to the end, they allowed their own commanders to gain time and prevent an enemy breakthrough through the beachhead.
(c) Enemy air forces. Although limited in their range, they controlled not only the main battlefield but also its approaches and supply routes to a depth of 150 to 200 kilometers. In addition, the enemy brought the war to the front of the Reich territory with its tactical bombers, aiming to destroy the extensive railway network, particularly marshalling yards, locomotive repair centers, bridges, and important sectors related to the military industry.
In addition to targeting the highly developed railway network and numerous main and secondary roads, the enemy managed to interrupt supplies and reinforcements with its air attacks, causing so many losses among reserves and motorized columns that the issues of supply and the arrival of reinforcements became serious problems. The closer one got to the front zone, the more frequent fighter-bomber attacks on the roads became. Their attacks prevented any major movement in good weather and also at night by using flares. The enemy air force’s efforts had been concentrated on the main roads, but they now attacked any form of movement within an area at least 20 kilometers behind the front line, while maintaining their actions in the heart of the battle. If enemy reconnaissance aircraft detected a troop gathering, a bomber formation appeared in the sky and attacked without delay. It was absolutely essential that motorized vehicles maintain their distance from each other in the columns.
The command posts managed to maintain communication thanks to their wireless stations. Radio stations must therefore remain at a reasonable distance from their command posts to avoid being hit in the event of a bombing raid. When command posts were not concreted, their position had to be changed regularly. Advance reconnaissance was imperative; the positions were then transmitted to unit commanders so that the command posts could be located.
Within two and a half days, the enemy bridgehead was about 100 kilometers deep and nearly 29,000 enemy aircraft sorties were flown; 2,300 aircraft per day dive-attacked and bombed any movement on the ground, even a single soldier.
(d) Additional Effects — Rail transport, which, due to the overall traffic situation, has been reduced to a minimum, can only operate up to 200-250 kilometers from the front, and again without advance planning. Railway timetables change hourly depending on weather conditions; trains may move from stage to stage or may only travel at night. Thus, as already noted, heavy air attacks can lead to freight being blocked on certain sections of the railway. Terminals are constantly changing, which has consequences for the unloading of units and the establishment of supply points, thus requiring extraordinary flexibility on the part of the command and mobile manpower units to carry out rapid unloading ordered at the sound of a whistle.
Advancement by day is to be avoided. The short summer nights must be used efficiently from dusk to dawn to reconnoiter routes and crossing points, prepare for flexible engagements, organize rapid marches in separate groups, avoid main routes, and deploy in previously reconnoitered rest areas. Troops must be prepared for low-altitude attacks and be able to immediately employ all possible means of protection. The long marches of mechanized units across the countryside and the transport of supplies during these long-distance marches also result in losses due to enemy action and defections, both technical and internal. The command must take these losses into account and eliminate them while being able to deliver troops, supplies, and reinforcements to the right place at the right time.
Our own systematically applied countermeasures must provide a methodical operational response to the enemy’s strategy.
B
(a) In secure areas, new units transported to all reinforcement rallying points must be kept informed of the air situation, the actions to take when danger appears and when the alert is sounded, and during unloading operations.
Advance patrols must not be sent out too early. The element leader of each advance patrol must report regularly to the Western High Command or the Army High Command.
In accordance with the regulations of the General Commanding the Western Troops, a large quantity of maps (small) must be prepared at all unloading stations for distribution by representatives of the Transport Command to newly arrived personnel. (The same procedure must be applied to patrol leaders of the Army High Command, etc.).
During marches, combat patrols must be composed of guides familiar with the area and the other units to be relieved. Bridge reconnaissance must be conducted systematically and in a timely manner, as destruction may have occurred in the meantime. The marching order and guarding of roads in secure areas are the responsibility of the military command, which must be kept informed in a timely manner regarding the arrival of new units, the objectives of a march and patrols, etc.
(b) Near the firing zone, all movements toward the battlefield during the day—changing troop dispositions or adopting a new formation—require more time than before, even with significant delays taken into account. Therefore, movements and combat must take place at dusk and in the dark to prevent the effects of enemy air forces and direct observation by enemy gunners.
The organization of the entire battlefield requires rigid organization from the rear to the front line.
The commanders of traffic units must be responsible for controlling traffic coming and going to the front; circular routes around villages must be mapped and marked with signs. The materials for making signs must be prepared, roads and intersections under attack by enemy aircraft must be marked with danger signs, and traffic must be restricted to small formations that travel only in darkness or in weather conditions equivalent to darkness. Crossings for incoming and outgoing supplies must be established, along with reconnaissance of stopping areas for columns outside bases. Small, well-distributed intermediate supply depots must be built in suitable locations and must be secured.
The appointment of responsible officers (primarily from the engineering corps) is necessary to ensure continuous road maintenance; with the support of the units assigned to them, these officers must assist the inhabitants in ensuring that they are always passable. Any light anti-aircraft weapons not strictly necessary in the rear security zone (protecting targets already destroyed or now playing only a secondary role) must be deployed at supply points along the front; countermeasures will be provided to all low-altitude attacks.
II — Camouflage in all its forms must be repeatedly encouraged. – The chain of command and the troops must be aware that when a unit is detected by an enemy aircraft, it will be attacked from the air until it is completely disabled. Thus, tank decoys must be created at irregular intervals to the right and left of the roads, under the responsibility of traffic officers and with the assistance of available local residents and troops. Camouflage appropriate to the environment is always necessary. The roads must be cleared of damaged vehicles by the road maintenance service as quickly as possible.
III—The enemy has deployed a very strong naval force off the beachhead. It is employed as a highly mobile, always-available artillery system, capable of providing defensive fire when we attack or of supporting one of its attacks. During the day, highly effective fire corrections are provided by aerial observers as well as forward observers along the front. The rapid rate of fire and range of the naval guns allow the enemy naval forces to play an important role in the battle. Any daytime tank movement in open country is prohibited within the range of the naval artillery.
IV—The enemy managed to halt the attack of one of our divisions, which had gained ground, by employing its airborne forces in such a way that the division’s support forces were forced to engage in combat during the advance. They thus prevented the division from successfully carrying out this attack. We must recognize from the facts that the enemy will continue to employ this practice, even if our tanks attack. Therefore, all units behind the front must be ready to defend themselves immediately in order to destroy the airborne forces.
V – The enemy is preparing small-scale attacks with semblance of artillery barrages, using small trench mortars, which precede the tanks themselves, supported by motorized infantry.
VI – The population must be strictly controlled, especially those traveling on the roads fleeing the fighting in the combat zone and in regions located far from the front. If every alert unit is used properly, the situation on the roads can quickly change.
Suspicious individuals, especially young men carrying “small suitcases,” can sneak onto them secretly. Anyone who is not originally from a particular location or who cannot clearly explain their destination must be arrested and handed over to the concentration camp units.
VII – Means of Communication. Wired connections in the combat zone are proving unusable. Apart from radios, only mechanical means of communication remain: the courier on a bicycle or motorcycle, the officer in a sidecar or light armored vehicle, and for short distances, a courier on foot.
The entire force and commanders must do everything possible to understand the entire situation and seek liaison with superiors or subordinates, especially when nominal means of communication no longer function. This is especially important when commanders are reinforced or when they take command of a larger unit. Commanders must be continuously informed of the position of the vanguard of these units, also taking into account halts and the continuation of the advance. It is essential for the command to be constantly informed of the location of motorized units, which are an integral part of ground movements.
These units or elements of units must be supported by liaison officers, who accompany them and transmit orders when necessary. The liaison officer knows the position of these formations during the hours that follow and is able to report them to his superior. He can also communicate to his commander the troop’s needs regarding food and supplies and provide for them.
During the first days of the major battle, it appeared that, under certain conditions during the battle, the troop’s formations were abandoned or transformed. This should only be a temporary emergency solution. As soon as conditions permitted again, clear orders should allow for a reorganization of the formations.
I have deliberately described these experiences in detail because a large number of units in the west were newly arrived and, despite previous orders and instructions, were unfamiliar with how to conduct themselves in battle.
Commander-in-Chief of the West,
(Signed) von Rundstedt,
Field Marshal.
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