The Battle of Caen (1944)
Was the capture of Caen by the British possible as early as June 6, 1944?
Planning for Operation Neptune, the initial phase of Operation Overlord, called for the city of Caen to fall to the Allies on the evening of D-Day, June 6, 1944. In the end, the entire city was not taken until July 18, 42 days later. In his post-war memoirs, General Montgomery justified the delay by explaining that Caen was more a staging post for German armored units than an objective to be seized as soon as possible[1].
Had an operational opportunity been missed? Did the Allies have the tactical means to seize the town in accordance with their initial orders? The study of the principles of strategy that went wrong should enable us to identify the factual reasons why the British 1st Corps was unable to complete its mission.
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Caen: achievable or out of reach for the British?
Allied objectives.
The initial Allied plan called for Caen to be taken on the evening of June 6 by British troops of the 185th Infantry Brigade (3rd Infantry Division, 1st Corps, 2nd Army). Situated just thirteen kilometers from the coastline, the town had a population of almost 54,000 in 1944, and represented a lock blocking access to the Caen plain: these stretches, extending via Falaise to Trun and forming a veritable mobility corridor for mechanized units, offered the possibility of overturning opposing lines to theoretically reach the banks of the Seine ninety days after D-Day. The specific nature of the ground along this plain also made it possible to establish airfields, providing support and cover for ground operations from the air.
German defensive system.
The Germans, well aware of the imminence of a landing along the Channel coast, fortified the mouth of the Orne (identified as a prime site for British raids) and the coastal strip with the construction of various strongpoints forming part of the famous static “Atlantic Wall” system. The city of Caen, for its part, was not fortified in the strict sense of the term: apart from a few casemates erected in the heart of the city for anti-aircraft protection, there were two main defensive complexes to the north (the basic self-protection network of the underground command post of the 716. Infanterie-Division) and to the west (Carpiquet airfield support point).
A changing balance of power.
In detail, between the “Sword” beach and Caen, the Germans had the strength of four battalions belonging to two different divisions (two static on the coast of the 716. Infantry-Division and two mobile ones in the second echelon, from the 21. Panzerdivision). In reserve, they had to rely on the remaining 21. Panzerdivision and part of the 12. SS-Panzerdivision.
The Germans faced the British 1st Corps, with three infantry brigades reinforced by an armored brigade and a commando brigade. To these ground forces should be added the substantial support of the air force and the armada, capable at best of destroying, at worst of interdicting, any opposing armored counter-attack[2]. This balance of forces, clearly in favor of the Allies in the early stages of the offensive, was likely to be called into question in the event of a massive and concentrated commitment of German armored forces in the days following the launch of Overlord. The capture of Caen as quickly as possible, to deny the Germans access to the Caen-Cherbourg road, was essential.
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Amended or over-applied principles of strategy.
A safety principle that prevents the British from seizing a major opportunity.
On June 6, the attackers fell behind schedule due to road congestion and a stronger-than-expected defense, particularly at Colleville-sur-Orne where the forces of the 3rd Infantry Division were temporarily blocked by strongpoint Wn 17 (“Hillman”). Staffordshire Yeomanry tanks (27th Armoured Brigade) reached Biéville-sur-Orne, but were eventually halted by elements of Panzer-Regiment 22 (21. Panzerdivision). A handful of British soldiers belonging to reconnaissance units reached the northern outskirts of Caen at Calvaire Saint-Julien and Calvaire Saint-Étienne, but quickly turned back. From 4 p.m. onwards, elements of the 21. Panzerdivision were able to launch a double reconnaissance operation directed towards Lion-sur-Mer (where they provided information on the Allied position until 9 p.m., before withdrawing in the direction of Caen) and north of Caen: the British interpreted these deployments as a massive, coordinated counter-attack. As a result, they decided to halt all progress, adopting a defensive posture for the night, forbidding themselves to attempt a breakthrough in the evening or at night.
Unused intelligence from I (GB) Corps reconnaissance echelons indicating the absence of a consolidated defensive position in and around the town of Caen prevented the British from making the final effort to gain a foothold in the capital of Lower Normandy. This information was dwarfed by that of the presence of German armour, which, however, did not intervene in sufficient volume or in a coordinated fashion. Their inability to gauge the real scope of the enemy’s offensive maneuver led the British to halt the movement of an entire army corps for almost fourteen hours.
This over-application of the principle of safety was due above all to the psychosis that the German armoured divisions were able to cause among Allied staffs, due to the initial fragility of the amphibious force’s firepower. This fear was reflected in the excessive attention paid to reports of the presence of enemy armor: however, the 21. Panzerdivision had only part of its armor at its disposal (the 4th company of Panzer-Regiment 22, the most richly endowed, comprised “only” 17 Mark IV[3]). When Oberst Rauch’s 2nd Battalion of Panzergrenadier-Regiment 192 moved towards Lion-sur-Mer, it was accompanied by only 6 Panzer IVs from Panzer-Regiment 22 [4]. The other battle group commanded by Oberst von Oppeln-Bronikowski lost 9 of its 40 tanks in the Lebisey sector in just a few minutes, with no British casualties[5].
Failure to maintain initial targets.
From June 7, while the 2nd British Army’s priority was still the capture of Caen[6], General Montgomery amended Operation Perch, proposing to bypass the town by means of a complex manoeuvre led to the east by the I (GB) Corps and to the west by the XXX (GB) Corps. But this project, dubbed “Wild Oats”, was eventually abandoned, especially as the 21. Panzerdivision succeeded in securing the I (GB) Corps.
On June 12, Montgomery finally ordered the VIII (GB) Corps to relaunch the offensive west of the city towards Villers-Bocage, adopting part of the Operation Perch plan in order to avoid a head-on clash with the enemy’s entrenched defenses north of Caen. This decision gave the Germans the opportunity to further consolidate their defensive position around the capital of Lower Normandy, taking advantage of key positions such as hill 112 at Esquay-Notre-Dame and the Carpiquet airfield. The decision to massively bomb the city of Caen to hinder German movements failed to hinder the establishment of a solid defensive curtain.
Operation Epsom on June 26, aimed at forcing Panzergruppe West to commit its reserves in order to reduce the volume of forces defending Caen, failed to achieve its objectives.
In the end, by regularly changing the 2nd British Army’s initial objective (to draw German armor in or out of the immediate vicinity of Caen), the Allies lost 42 days, during which they suffered very heavy human and material losses.
It was the return to frontal attack that gave the Allies the opportunity, via Operation Charnwood on the evening of July 7, to enter the historic center of Caen. This direct offensive, preceded by a massive air raid and led by two front-line divisions supported by land and naval artillery, ensured the breakthrough of the enemy’s position, even though the right bank remained under German domination from July 9 to 18 (the Germans abandoned it when Operation Goodwood was launched).
The pause in the night offensive as a factor in the loss of initiative.
The preference for daylight combat prevented the British from exploiting the surprise effect of the amphibious attack via the second echelon of the 1st corps. The interruption of the offensive during the night phase on the basis of misinterpreted information until the following morning gave the Germans fourteen hours to reorganize and adopt an effective defensive posture, against which the 3rd Infantry Division broke at 8 a.m. on June 7.
While a night pause can be explained for technical reasons (lack of visibility limiting fire support and increasing the risk of fratricidal fire during the offensive) and tactical-logistical reasons (resupply, unit relief, troop rest), it is more questionable when it takes place in the first 24 hours following the launch of the offensive, all the more so when the attacker has “fresh” reserves.
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The capture of Caen on June 6, 1944 appeared to be an objective within the reach of the British 1st Corps, which benefited from a favorable balance of forces and the initiative to make tactical decisions. But fearing an overestimated threat, the decision to bypass the city rather than approach it head-on (against the strategic principle of simplicity) ultimately led to increased human and material losses, as well as delays in the initial planning.
The accumulation of losses suffered by the British 2nd Army between June 7 and July 18, as a result of its inability to seize Caen quickly, prompted the War Office to impose cautionary orders on General Montgomery. Indeed, on July 20, the British were obliged to preserve the fighting potential of their 2nd Army over the coming weeks, in order to maintain a predominant role in the inter-allied councils over the long term.[7].
Marc Laurenceau
[1] « On the eastern flank, in the Caen sector, the acquisition of ground was not so pressing ; the need there was by hard fighting to make the enemy commit his reserves, so that the American forces would meet less oposition in their advances to gain the territory which was vital on the west. » in The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery, Pen & Sword Military, 2005, page 254.
However, while the objectives of Operation Perch, as validated by Montgomery before D-Day, were indeed to draw German armor west of Caen, the final effect was to open the gateway to the Caen plain. Indeed, the XXX (GB) Corps had to break through towards Mont Pinçon to force the German forces to engage there en masse (and not against the Americans), thereby reducing the density of the defensive lines barring the Caen plain.
[2] The range of the guns of the Allied fire support ships cruising off Sword Beach (“Bombardment Force D”) reached 26 km, i.e. beyond the southern suburbs of Caen.
[3] Werner Kortenhaus, Combat History of 21st Panzer Division 1943-45, Helion and Company, 2018.
[4] Ibid.
[5] War Diary, 2nd Battalion KSLI, British 3rd Division, Imperial War Museum, 1944 et War Diary, Staffordshire Yeomanry, Imperial War Museum, 1944.
[6] Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, Hutchison of London, 1958, page 61.
[7] L. F. Ellis,Victory in the West, Volume 1: The Battle Of Normandy, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1962.
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